Harvard Business School
9-799-158
June 6, 1999
Matching Dell
Dell Computer had pioneered the widely publicized “Direct Model” in the personal
computer (PC) industry. While competitors sold primarily through distributors, resellers, and retail
sites, Dell took orders directly from customers, especially corporate customers. Once it received an
order, Dell rapidly built computers to customer specifications and shipped machines directly to the
customer.
Between 1994 and 1998, the revenue of Dell Computer Corporation rose from $3.5 billion to
$18.2 billion, and profits increased from $149 million to $1.5 billion. The company’s stock price rose
by 5,600%. During the same period, Dell grew twice as fast as its major rivals in the personal
computer market and tripled its market share. In the first half of 1998, Dell reported operating
earnings that were greater than the personal computer earnings of Compaq, Gateway, Hewlett-
Packard, and IBM combined.1 On Forbes magazine’s list of the richest Americans, Michael Dell, the
33-year-old founder of Dell Computer, ranked fourth with an estimated worth of $13 billion. He
trailed only Bill Gates, Warren Buffett, and Paul Allen on the list and was worth more than Gates had
been at the same age.2
DO NOT COPY
History. Electronic computers emerged from military research undertaken during World
War II. In 1949, the magazine Popular Mechanics predicted that “Computers in the future
may…perhaps only weigh 1.5 tons.” For the following three decades, large mainframe and
minicomputers, produced by vertically integrated firms such as IBM and Digital Equipment
Corporations (DEC), dominated the market. As late as 1977, Kenneth Olsen, founder of
minicomputer maker DEC, opined, “There is no reason for any individual to have a computer in their
home.”4
The success of the Direct Model attracted the intense scrutiny of Dell’s competitors. By 1997,
headlines such as “Now Everyone in PCs Wants to Be Like Mike,” “Compaq Reengineers the
Channel: Will It Be Enough to Slow Dell’s Momentum?” and “In Search of Greener Pastures, Gateway
Moves on Dell’s Turf” peppered the PC trade press.3 By late 1998, virtually every major PC
manufacturer had taken some step to match Dell’s approach.
Professors Jan W. Rivkin and Michael E. Porter prepared this case from public sources with the assistance of Research
Associate Faramarz Nabavi as the basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of
an administrative situation. The case draws on a report prepared by Charlie Bruin, Markus Cappel, Tom Galizia, and Laila
Worrell, all MBA 1998.
Copyright © 1999 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to
reproduce materials, call 1-800-545-7685 or write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163. No
part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in
any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise—without the
permission of Harvard Business School.
The Personal Computer Industry
1
799-158
Matching Dell
However, electronic hobbyists were already purchasing mail-order and retail kits which
allowed them to assemble primitive computers at home. These kits pieced together components that
were either altogether new or newly affordable: microprocessors made by start-ups such as Intel,
random-access and read-only memories, power supplies, and so forth. (A Glossary at the end of the
case defines technical terms.)
Between 1975 and 1981, a series of firms began to offer increasingly integrated, pre-
assembled personal computers.5 Start-ups such as Apple Computer and MITS, and midsize firms
such as Tandy / Radio Shack and Commodore, led the early market, gaining popularity among
hobbyists and educational institutions with easy-to-use machines for ordinary people. Established
firms including Texas Instruments, Hewlett-Packard, Zenith, NEC, Xerox, IBM, Toshiba, Sanyo, Sony,
Olivetti, Wang, and DEC soon joined the entrepreneurs and began to produce PCs.
IBM launched its first PC in 1981 and, two years later, held 42% of the market. With a world-
renowned corporate sales force and service organization, IBM commanded 61% of the market for
mainframe computers and produced many of the components for its mainframes.6 In launching its
PC, however, IBM purchased many components. It commissioned a start-up software firm,
Microsoft, to write the operating system for its PC and adopted a microprocessor architecture
designed by Intel. Publishing most of the specifications for its PC system, IBM established an “open
architecture” to encourage software developers to write programs for the IBM PC and to spur other
firms to make compatible peripherals such as printers. Most of the industry rapidly rallied around
the IBM standards. By 1983, the major alternative standard, a proprietary system championed by
Apple, held only 20% of the market.7
DO NOT COPY
IBM used its huge sales force to sell personal computers to large corporate accounts. Volume
discounts encouraged large firms to centralize PC purchases through corporate MIS departments,
with whom IBM sales people had strong relationships. To serve small businesses and individuals,
IBM turned to retail stores such as Sears and Computerland.8 It also encouraged the development of
a network of distributors and dealers known as value-added resellers. These resellers not only sold PCs
to customers, but also guided them through the purchase of what was still an unfamiliar product.
Resellers commonly handled installation, configured software, pieced together customer networks,
and serviced machines on an on-going basis. In small and midsize businesses, employees rarely had
the skills to do what resellers did, and few companies had enough PCs to justify hiring trained
personnel.
As demand for IBM’s PCs exploded, other firms began to offer “IBM clones.” Compaq
entered the market with a low-priced portable clone in 1982 and booked $100 million of revenue
during its first year, making it the fastest growing firm in American history. A host of other start-ups
followed Compaq’s lead and entered the market with IBM clones. Among these entrants was Dell
Computer Corporation, incorporated in 1984. During the same period, most established competitors
such as Hewlett-Packard shifted from proprietary architectures to the IBM standard.
By 1986, IBM realized that it had set a standard, but in doing so, had spawned a set of
imitators while ceding the rights to the most valuable components of the PC—the microprocessor and
the operating system—to Intel and Microsoft. In 1986, IBM declined to adopt Intel’s third-generation
Publicité
microprocessor, the 386 chip. In introducing its PS/2 line of computers in 1987, IBM tried to make the
PC more proprietary. Compaq both adopted the 386 chip and led a group of nine clone makers in
affirming the existing industry standards. Though IBM subsequently accepted the 386, its market
share fell from 37.0% in 1985 to 16.9% in 1989.9
Like IBM, makers of IBM clones relied on resellers and retail stores to reach customers. While
IBM initially steered resellers away from the largest corporate accounts, start-ups such as Compaq
without internal sales forces encouraged resellers to cater to large customers. In time, even IBM
relied heavily on resellers to service large accounts.
2
Matching Dell
799-158
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, PC performance improved and prices fell at a rapid clip.
Intel’s 386DX microprocessor, introduced in 1985, was priced at $299 and could perform 2.5 million
instructions per second (MIPS)—a price of $120 per MIPS. Intel’s Pentium II microprocessor,
launched in 1998, was priced at $699 and could carry out 675 MIPS—$1 per MIPS.10 In addition, the
range of software available for the personal computer expanded dramatically.
Microsoft released its new operating system Windows 3.0 in 1990, and over the next four
years, the user-friendly Windows became ubiquitous on PCs configured to the IBM standard. Indeed,
the standard soon became known as “Wintel,” reflecting the combination of the Windows operating
system and Intel’s x86 microprocessor architecture. By 1991, between 85% and 90% of computers
sold conformed to Microsoft / Intel standards, with the remainder using the proprietary Apple
operating system and a Motorola microprocessor.
The initial surge in sales of personal computers crested in 1990, just as a recession gripped the
United States. In newspapers around the world, Dell Computer ran advertisements showing that its
prices were much, much lower than Compaq’s list prices. Compaq usually discounted its PCs well
below the list price, but the advertising campaign was highly effective. In response, Compaq slashed
its prices by as much as 32%, introduced 41 new products in 1992, and added new distribution
channels.11 A vigorous price war followed.
Demand growth recovered in the mid-1990s, buoyed by strong economic growth and the
emergence of new, popular services involving computer networks. Proliferation of electronic mail
and growth of the World Wide Web gave customers, especially individual consumers, new reasons to
purchase a personal computer. PC prices continued to decline. Compaq offered a powerful personal
computer for less than $1,000 in 1997, and other companies rushed to offer similarly inexpensive PCs.
By December 1998, the prices of the least expensive PCs had plunged to $499. In the United States,
45.5% of households owned a computer in 1998, and the figure was expected to rise to 49.5% by
2000.12 Household ownership levels were lower but also growing in Europe and Asia. See Exhibits 1
and 2 for market size and share data over time.
DO NOT COPY
Hardware components such as housings, keyboards, memory chips, motherboards, disk
drives, monitors, modems, and connectors could be purchased in highly competitive global markets
served by numerous companies. In contrast, microprocessors were supplied by only a handful of
companies. Intel dominated this market, providing 80-90% of the microprocessors for Wintel PCs.13
By 1998, roughly 96% of new PCs followed the Wintel standard.14 Virtually all of the rest employed
the Apple standard with PowerPC microprocessors. Other semiconductor makers such as AMD and
Cyrix offered low-priced microprocessors which competed with Intel’s and used a similar
architecture, but historically, these companies had made few inroads into Intel’s near-monopoly. In
the sub-$1,000 market, AMD and Cyrix appeared finally to have made some headway in unseating
Intel. Roughly half of the sub-$1,000 PCs sold during 1998 were equipped with an AMD processor.15
Intel ordinarily made its microprocessors available to all major purchasers at a standard
price, thereby maintaining a level playing field among the leading PC makers. When Intel released a
new generation of microprocessors, demand typically exceeded supply. Intel then rationed its new
product, allotting microprocessors to PC makers in proportions that were based roughly on past
purchases. The price of a microprocessor of a given generation declined rapidly as a generation aged,
as did the price of PCs made with them. PC margins were typically highest during the early days of a
microprocessor generation.
Products in 1998. PC makers followed well-established standards to piece together modular
components of hardware and software. The resulting machines differed widely in their processing
speeds, memory capacities, portability, software configurations, modem speeds, and screen sizes, for
instance.
3
799-158
Matching Dell
The hardware and software that comprised a PC were often sold as an integrated bundle. PC
makers such as IBM, Compaq, and Dell would deliver computers with a Microsoft operating system
already installed and, in turn, would pay a fee to Microsoft. Increasingly, PCs were delivered with
pieces of application software also already installed.
Customers. PC buyers were usually divided into four categories: large and midsize
businesses / government; small businesses and offices; individual consumers; and educational
institutions. Exhibit 3 shows the portion of PC units and sales revenue accounted for by each set of
customers.
The core piece of software on a PC was the operating system. Virtually all PCs with x86
microprocessors employed an operating system made by Microsoft, usually some version of
Windows. A number of vendors offered “application software” such as word processors,
spreadsheets, database management systems, financial organizers, Web browsers, and electronic
messaging software. In this market, also, Microsoft held a preeminent position, accounting for nearly
80% of the market for so-called “office productivity applications” (e.g., word processors,
spreadsheets) and 10% of the overall $56 billion market for application software.16
As processing costs declined, the lines between PCs and other devices blurred. At the lower
end of the processing and memory spectrum, handheld electronic organizers had begun to compete
with the personal computer for applications such as electronic mail and portable computing. At the
higher end, PCs had become increasing hard to distinguish from workstations. Historically,
workstations had been several times faster and more expensive than PCs and had employed specially
designed microprocessors and distinct operating systems. In recent years, however, PCs based on the
fastest x86 microprocessors and Windows NT had begun to compete with the low end of the
workstation market. PC makers had also extended their product lines to include servers, powerful
Publicité
computers that sat at the hubs of computer networks.
DO NOT COPY
Large and midsize businesses and government institutions usually had significant MIS
departments that purchased, maintained, and supported PCs in a centralized fashion. Staff members
were highly knowledgeable about PCs. They were charged with providing a reliable network of
high-performance computers while also controlling information system costs. The capital cost of a PC
was only a portion of the total cost associated with the machine. Once a PC was purchased, MIS staff
had to tag it for identification purposes, configure software, install the machine at the user location,
train the users, and help users when they encountered problems. By one estimate, corporations spent
between $8,000 and $12,000 annually to support each desktop PC.17 Most large organizations had a
motley collection of PCs of various brands and vintages, making maintenance, support, and reliability
of machines problematic.
Individual consumers purchased PCs for home or home-office use. In choosing among
brands, individuals relied heavily on the evaluations of independent organizations such as Consumer
Reports. Individual buyers were a diverse lot, but tended to be more sensitive to price and more
interested in a computer’s brand name than were business buyers.18 Some consumers also paid
attention to the brand of the microprocessor. Since 1990, Intel had spent an estimated $3 billion on
brand advertising for its microprocessors. Among individual consumers in the U.S., 30% of
purchasers were first-time buyers in 1998. This figure was expected to decline to 16% by 2000.19
Small businesses and offices typically lacked MIS staffs. Reliability, performance, support,
service, price, brand, and channel recommendations (see below) all played roles in the choice of a PC
by such organizations. By 1998, virtually all businesses had extensive experience with personal
computers.
In the eyes of some industry observers, buyers were divided into two true camps: Apple and
Wintel. Many long-time owners of Apple computers were highly, almost emotionally, attached to the
Apple standard, and they cursed the ascendancy of Wintel. Wintel customers, in contrast, tended to
4
Matching Dell
799-158
be less attached to a particular brand of computer. Apple was more successful in selling its PCs to
individuals and educational institutions than to businesses, though it thrived among desktop
publishers.
Channels. Personal computers flowed from manufacturers to customers via four channels:
retail stores, distributors (working with small resellers), integrated resellers, and direct distribution.20
Exhibit 4 shows the portion of PCs passing through each channel in various regions of the world.
A handful of large distributors such as Ingram Micro (with 1998 sales of $22.0 billion) and
Tech Data ($7.1 billion) supplied a full range of computer hardware and software to nearly 100,000
resellers.21 These resellers, typically small owner-managed firms, worked with business customers to
design, buy, configure, install, and support computer networks. According to one survey, 93% of end
users accepted reseller recommendations for computer purchases.22 Beyond charging for their value-
added services, distributors and resellers typically marked up hardware by a total of 5-7%, though
this mark-up had fallen in recent years.23
Retailers such as Circuit City and CompUSA in the United States and Time Computers in
Europe took delivery of PCs directly from manufacturers. Machines then passed through distribution
centers owned by the retailers on their way to stores. In stores, retail displays and sales people
played a significant role in helping customers select among models and manufacturers. Retail shelf
space was limited, and even large superstores typically carried only 3-5 brands of PCs. Computer
retailers operated on very thin margins. CompUSA, for example, earned overall gross margins of
14.1% and gross margins of roughly 7-9% on computers. It registered a net margin of 0.6% in 1998.
DO NOT COPY
A few resellers were large enough to deal directly with manufacturers rather than buy
through distributors. Integrated resellers such as MicroAge and Vanstar operated distribution
centers, fielded extensive sales and service organizations, and in some cases, managed the PC
networks of clients on an on-going basis. Vanstar, for instance, split its operations into three distinct
segments. The largest, involved in the procurement and installation of corporate PC networks,
earned a gross margin of 9.7% in 1998. A second segment devoted to network design and consulting
reported a gross margin of 44.4%, while a third involved in on-going network support and
maintenance earned a gross margin of 53.1%. Overall, Vanstar’s net margin in 1998 was a thin 1.3%.
Manufacturers usually agreed to buy back channel inventory that did not sell. In addition,
they provided price protection to resellers and distributors: if the price of a computer fell while it was
in the distribution channel, the manufacturer would reimburse the reseller or distributor accordingly.
By one estimate, inventory buy-backs and price protection cost PC manufacturers 2.5 cents on every
dollar of revenue. Manufacturers spent another 2.5 cents advertising to resellers and distributors,
funding the market development activities of channel players, and managing product returns. PCs
typically took four to five weeks to pass from the PC maker through distributors and resellers to
customers.24
Manufacturing. Computer makers used basic assembly-line techniques to assemble PCs
from standard parts. By the early 1990s, a manufacturer could buy and install the capital equipment
required for an efficient PC assembly line, capable of assembling 250,000 PCs per year, with an
investment of roughly a million dollars.25 Contract manufacturers, many in Asia, also stood ready to
make PCs on behalf of other firms. Exhibit 5 shows the structure of the costs typically incurred to
assemble a PC that would retail for roughly $1,000.
A fourth and final channel led directly from the manufacturer to the customer. A handful of
PC manufacturers took orders directly from customers, either over the telephone and Internet or by
means of internal sales forces. They then delivered PCs via third-party shippers such as UPS.
The prices of components used to make PCs had typically declined 25-30% per year. In 1998,
prices declined even faster, at a rate of roughly 1% per week. The financial crisis in Asia (where
5
799-158
Matching Dell
Dell Computer Corporation
many component makers were located), increased competition faced by Intel, and gluts in the
markets for several components all contributed to the faster decline in prices.26
“It was too late to challenge the technical standard and the dealer network had been done
already. Compaq was already very strong in retail. A new marketing and distribution
Publicité
strategy was something new, however.”28
While a freshman at the University of Texas at Austin, 18-year-old Michael Dell started a
part-time business in his dorm room: he formatted hard disks for personal computers and added
extra memory, disk drives, and modems to IBM clones, selling them for as much as 40% less than
comparable IBM machines. Reluctant to reveal this distraction from his studies, Dell hid PCs in his
roommate’s bathtub when his parents came to visit.29
Marketing and sales. PC manufacturers took a variety of approaches to marketing and sales.
Companies such as Apple, Hewlett-Packard, and IBM spent as much as 2-3% of sales on advertising
in order to develop recognizable brands. Others produced unbranded “white box” PCs and did not
advertise to end users at all. Sales forces varied from the 25,000-strong sales organization of IBM to
the virtually nonexistent sales forces of white-box PC makers. White-box manufacturers served 23%
of the market in North America, 50% in Europe and Asia, and as much as 90% in China.27
DO NOT COPY
Dell used indicators of a company’s potential PC purchases, such as the number of employees
and the number of PCs per employee, to divide customers into two groups: Relationship buyers and
Transaction buyers.33 Relationship buyers were large companies and institutions that could be
counted on to place repeated orders for multiple PCs. Dell assigned a team of outside sales reps and
inside sales reps to each Relationship account. Over a thousand outside sales reps spent their time in
the field, understanding customer needs, courting customer personnel, helping customers configure
their information systems, and promoting Dell’s products and services. Inside sales reps, located in
call centers, received telephone calls from assigned customers. Because Relationship customers
typically specified particular PC configurations that their employees were allowed to order, the inside
reps serving such customers simply took orders and provided product and delivery information.
Both inside and outside sales reps had access to on-line information about a customer’s entire
Sales and marketing. While most competitors supplied machines based on orders from
distributors, resellers, and retailers, Dell took orders directly from customers. Businesses and
government institutions accounted for 77% of Dell’s sales, home and small office users 18%, and
educational institutions 5%. Very large customers, who purchased more than $1 million in PCs each
year, provided 70% of the firm’s revenue.31 No single customer represented more than 2% of Dell’s
sales.32
When revenue reached $80,000 per month in 1984, Dell dropped out of college and founded
Dell Computer Corporation. Already, companies such as Exxon and Mobil were clamoring for 50 to
100 of Dell’s machines at a time.30 In 1985, Dell shifted from upgrading the machines of other
manufacturers to assembling Dell-branded PCs. Revenue rose each subsequent year. (See Exhibit 6
for financial results.)
The basic elements of Dell’s Direct Model came together early in the company’s history and
remained in place in 1998. The company dealt directly with end customers. It served primarily
corporate customers and offered them high-performance PCs at relatively low prices. PCs were
customized to buyer specifications, and assembly commenced only after Dell received an order.
6
Matching Dell
799-158
purchase history and worked closely with Dell personnel responsible for after-sale service and
technical support. Dell tended to realize its highest gross margins among Relationship buyers.34
Transaction buyers included small-to-medium businesses and home computer users. The
company reached these customers via advertisements in trade journals and business publications,
catalogs, and direct marketing. Customers who wanted to buy a PC or obtain information could
reach an inside sales rep by calling 1-800-BUY-DELL (a different number than that used by
Relationship buyers). Inside sales reps for Transaction buyers provided product information and
actively encouraged customers to purchase more advanced PCs. Traditionally, Dell avoided the
inexperienced Transaction buyer. Morton Topfer, Vice Chairman of Dell, explained: “Consumers at
retail don’t know what they are looking for, other than price. We, on the other hand, like to sell to the
educated consumer.”35
In late 1990, Dell departed from its Direct Model and entered the retail channel. The move,
Michael Dell said, would “[provide] us with the opportunity to generate significant new business and
increase Dell’s market penetration,” especially among “PC customers—particularly at the entry
level—who want to physically ‘touch and feel’ a unit before they buy.”36 Accordingly, Dell produced
two lines of standard PCs and reached distribution agreements with computer superstores such as
CompUSA and warehouse clubs such as Sam’s Club. Sales through the retail channel were brisk, but
Dell soon found that it was losing money on retail sales. Exhibit 7 compares the margins which Dell
earned in the direct and retail channels. Retail losses contributed to Dell’s poor financial results in
1993, as did a major recall of notebook computers. In 1994, Dell withdrew from retail stores.
DO NOT COPY
As Dell had grown, it had subdivided its customer base into finer and finer categories. In
1994, buyers were classified as large customers or small customers. By 1996, the large customer
classification had been split into large companies, midsize companies, and government and
educational institutions. By 1998, large companies had been split into global enterprise accounts and
other large companies; government and educational accounts into federal, state and local, and
educational; and small customers into small companies and consumers.37 In addition, sales efforts
were divided by region and, within region, by country. Michael Dell explained that such divisions
were accomplished “for a lot of reasons. One is to identify unique opportunities and economics. The
other is purely a managerial issue: you can’t possibly manage something well if it’s too big.”38
For thousands of Relationship customers, Dell had designed custom Premier PagesSM. On
these secure Web pages, an employee of a customer might find pager numbers for their Dell account
team or a list of computer configurations that had been approved by the customer’s purchasing
manager, for instance. By December of 1998, transactions totaling $10 million per day involved
www.dell.com.39
Dell launched its Web site www.dell.com in July of 1996, and increasingly, customers were
using the site to contact Dell. Transaction buyers could obtain product information, configure a
computer system, check pricing, place an order, and track an order’s progress. They could also gain
access to the complete catalog of service and support information used by Dell’s service
representatives.
Occasionally, Dell sold to resellers. In December 1997, for instance, it sent a flyer to a limited
number of resellers offering older systems to resellers at prices 15-20% below the prices quoted at
www.dell.com. However, Dell did not allow returns or provide price protection.40 Roughly 5% of
Publicité
Dell’s systems were purchased by resellers.41
Production, logistics, and procurement. Dell manufactured machines that were—within the
guidelines of a broad menu—tailored to customer needs. The company made customized PCs based
on actual orders and held no finished goods inventory of standardized machines. Dell operated
manufacturing facilities in Austin, Texas; Limerick, Ireland; Penang, Malaysia; and Xiamen, China. A
7
799-158
Matching Dell
fifth site was slated for Alvorada, Brazil. Daily meetings matched production schedules with sales
flows. Keith Maxwell, Dell’s vice president for worldwide operations, commented:42
[The current production system] requires that the whole organization be
integrated. You’ve eliminated buffers. When you have no buffers and you have no
inventory, the whole organization has to work together. There is no way to let things
pile up, because you have no piles.
Once received, an order was sent electronically to the appropriate manufacturing facility.
There, a computer generated a parts list for the order and assigned the order a bar code for tracking
purposes. Dell’s older facilities were organized in assembly-line fashion: as the chassis of the
machine traveled down the line, the hardware specified by the parts list was added. Its newest
facility in Austin employed five-person manufacturing cells: parts for a PC were compiled in a bin,
the bin sent to a cell, and the computer assembled there. The company found that the cells delivered
machines with fewer defects more efficiently.43
After assembly, the machine moved to a software loading zone. There, special machines and
a very-high-speed computer network installed software specified by the customer: an operating
system, commercial application software, and diagnostic software. For some corporate customers,
Dell also loaded proprietary software. The fully equipped machine proceeded to a “burn-in” area,
where it was tested for several hours. Finally, it was boxed along with accessories and shipped to the
customer. Dell maintained shipping contracts with a number of third-party shippers such as UPS and
Airborne Express.
DO NOT COPY
Dell worked closely with suppliers to arrange just-in-time delivery of parts. Dell had
whittled its days of inventory down from 32 in 1995 to 7 in 1998.47 Since 1992, it had reduced the
number of suppliers for its Austin facility from 204 to 47.48 With remaining suppliers, Dell maintained
close electronic links, communicating replenishment needs to some vendors on an hourly basis. The
electronic links allowed Dell to direct some suppliers’ shipments straight to its customers. Computer
monitors supplied by Sony, for instance, never passed through Dell’s facilities. Rather, Dell
communicated the order for a monitor to Sony and to its shipper. The shipper picked up the
computer at Dell’s site, picked up the monitor at Sony’s, brought the boxes together, and delivered
them simultaneously to the customer. A web site customized to Sony gave both Sony and Dell
continuous access to ordering and manufacturing information.49 Michael Dell explained:50
The production process, from order entry to shipping, took about a day and a half.44 In the
midst of the Asian economic crisis in October of 1997, for instance, Dell received an emergency order
from the Nasdaq stock exchange for eight servers. The exchange’s existing servers were being
strained by unprecedented trading volumes. Dell shipped the customized, tested servers within 36
hours.45 At the same time, the production process could handle large orders. Also in late 1997, for
example, Dell built 2,000 desktop computers and 4,000 servers for Wal-Mart, loaded the machines
with proprietary software, and shipped them to 2,000 Wal-Mart stores.46
Dell encouraged suppliers to locate warehouses and production facilities close to its assembly
operations. Co-location was particularly easy to arrange near Dell’s major facilities in Austin, where
local and state government officials had worked since the 1950s and 1960s to attract high-technology
companies. Now known as “Silicon Hills,” the Austin region included 72 semiconductor
manufacturers and related suppliers, 160 computer and electronics manufacturing firms, more than
600 small and midsized software companies, and 825 technology consulting and services firms.51
…what’s the point in having a monitor put on a truck to Austin, Texas, and
then taken off the truck and sent on a little tour around the warehouse, only to be put
back on another truck? That’s just a big waste of time and money, unless we get our
jollies from touching monitors, which we don’t.
8
Matching Dell
799-158
In addition to selling hardware, Dell offered to install off-the-shelf software and a customer’s
proprietary software. On a custom basis, it installed and tested computers and networks at customer
sites. A new venture, Dell Financial Services, offered leasing, technology planning, and asset
management services.
Products and services. Dell provided two lines of desktop computers, one designed to be
reliable, stable, and highly compatible with corporate networks, the other intended to incorporate the
latest technology. Desktop computers ranged from $1,250 machines for individual consumers to
$4,000 PC for corporate networks. The company also offered two lines of notebook computers, with a
similar distinction between the lines. A line of network servers and, since 1998, a line of workstations
filled out the company’s product range.52 Dell’s workstations and servers used Windows NT and x86
microprocessors.
After a sale, Dell supported its products in several ways. Online, Dell offered 50,000 pages of
customer support information. A customer with a problem could also reach a technical support staff
of 1,300 representatives via a hotline that was manned 24 hours a day. Upon receiving a call, support
personnel would retrieve a file containing details of the customer’s computer, starting with the
original order and recording all subsequent service calls. Using the diagnostic software installed in
the factory, the customer and the support specialist could resolve the problem over the telephone in
approximately 90% of cases. For problems requiring an on-site visit, Dell contracted out service to
companies such as Xerox, Wang Global, and Unisys rather than employ service personnel itself. Most
problems requiring an on-site visit were resolved with 24 to 48 hours.53 Dell was working with
service providers to create measures of service quality and to improve the flow of data between them
and Dell.54 Dell also conveyed information concerning defective parts from the service providers back
to its suppliers.55
DO NOT COPY
In 1998, senior management paid special attention to several performance metrics. The
company monitored days of inventory by product component. It managed receivables and payables
Publicité
such that, on average, it received payment for its produc...